Warning reliability and driver performance in naturalistic driving by Sullivan, John M.
























WARNING RELIABILITY AND  
DRIVER PERFORMANCE  
IN NATURALISTIC DRIVING 
 





WARNING RELIABILITY AND DRIVING PERFORMANCE IN 


















The University of Michigan 
Transportation Research Institute 













Report No.  UMTRI-2007-44 
November 2007
 i 
Technical Report Documentation Page 
1.  Report No. 
UMTRI-2007-44 
2.  Government Accession No. 
 
3.  Recipient’s Catalog No. 
 
5.  Report Date 
November 2007 
4.  Title and Subtitle 
Warning Reliability and Driving Performance in Naturalistic 
Driving 6.  Performing Organization Code 
302753 
7.  Author(s) 
John M. Sullivan, Omer Tsimhoni, and Scott Bogard 
8.  Performing Organization Report No. 
UMTRI-2007-44 
10.  Work Unit no.  (TRAIS) 
 
9.  Performing Organization Name and Address 
The University of Michigan  
Transportation Research Institute 
2901 Baxter Road 
Ann Arbor, MI 48109-2150 U.S.A 
11.  Contracts or Grant No. 
 
13.  Type of Report and Period Covered 
 
12.  Sponsoring Agency Name and Address 
The University of Michigan 
Industry Affiliation Program for  
Human Factors in Transportation Safety 
14.  Sponsoring Agency Code 
 
15.  Supplementary Notes 
The Affiliation Program currently includes Alps Automotive/Alpine Electronics, Autoliv, 
Bendix, BMW, Bosch, Chrysler, Com-Corp Industries, Decoma Autosystems, Denso, Federal-
Mogul, Ford, GE, General Motors, Gentex, Grote Industries, Hella, Honda, Ichikoh Industries, 
Koito Manufacturing, Lang-Mekra North America, Magna Donnelly, Muth, Nissan, North 
American Lighting, Northrop Grumman, OSRAM Sylvania, Philips Lighting, Renault, SABIC 
Innovative Plastics, Siemens VDO Automotive, Sisecam, SL Corporation, Stanley Electric, 
Toyota Technical Center USA, Truck-Lite, Valeo, Visteon/ACH, and 3M Personal Safety 
Products. 
Information about the Affiliation Program is available at:  http://www.umich.edu/~industry/    
16.  Abstract   
 The goal of this study is to examine how driver behavior is influenced by the reliability 
of an in-vehicle warning system under naturalistic driving conditions.  Driver responses to 
lateral drift warnings were examined to determine if the latency to initiate a corrective steering 
response was related to prior system reliability.  An operational definition of subjective 
reliability was developed based on measures of the proportion of lateral drift warnings that the 
drivers responded to in the 24-hour period preceding a warning event that elicited a steering 
correction (called the day proportion).  Age, gender, weather condition, light level, road class, 
and day proportion were used to model response latency to make a steering correction in a linear 
model.  A main effect of day proportion was found, suggesting that reaction time to respond 
decreases by about 300 msecs as the day proportion increases from 0 to 1.  
 The study illustrates a method of quantifying subjective reliability and performance 
using naturalistic data.  The results suggest that latency to make a steering correction is 
inversely related to the perceived reliability of the warning system in the 24 hours preceding the 
warning. 
17.  Key Words 
Naturalistic driving, collision warning, lateral drift warning, 
reliability, false alarms, positive predictive value 
18.  Distribution Statement 
Unlimited 
19.  Security Classification (of this report) 
None 
20.  Security Classification (of this page) 
None 
21.  No. of Pages 
21 




Appreciation is extended to the members of the University of Michigan Industry 
Affiliation Program for Human Factors in Transportation Safety for support of this 
research.  The current members of the Program are: 
 




























SABIC Innovative Plastics 













Contents ......................................................................................................................................... iii 
Introduction......................................................................................................................................1 
Reliability...................................................................................................................................1 
Low Base Rate Events and Reliability.......................................................................................3 
Perceived Reliability, Time History, and Context .....................................................................5 




Dependent Measure ...................................................................................................................9 






The goal of this study is to examine how driver behavior is influenced by the 
reliability of an in-vehicle warning system under naturalistic driving conditions.  Such 
behavioral data may help inform the design of in-vehicle warning systems that may not 
be perfect in distinguishing a true warning condition from other less critical conditions.  
Naturalistic data from the road departure crash warning (RDCW) project (LeBlanc et al., 
2006) were used to infer the effects of reliability on real-world driving performance.  One 
advantage of a naturalistic dataset is that subjects are presented with a more realistic 
operation of the warning system than is possible in controlled experiments (e.g., Ben-
Yaacov, Maltz, & Shinar, 2002) or in a driving simulator (Bliss & Acton, 2003; Maltz & 
Shinar, 2004, 2007; Meyer, 2001).  In such experiments, the rate of warnings is often 
accelerated, and subjects behave less naturally with an experimenter present in the back 
seat or nearby. 
Reliability 
Reliability can be defined as the extent to which a system yields the same results 
on repeated trials.  Thus, an outcome is said to be reliable if it is repeatable.  A reliable 
in-vehicle warning system is one that provides alerts that are consistent over time such 
that a driver can expect or predict the system’s behavior.  Reliability is not the same as 
correctness—a system can be reliably incorrect if it bases a warning on pre-crash features 
that, while obvious to a driver, may not always be predictive of a crash (or near crash).  
For example, a lateral drift warning (LDW) may incorrectly advise a driver that the 
vehicle is leaving the lane when in fact the lane markings on the roadway are improperly 
drawn.  If the driver knows that the warnings are based on lane markings, the driver may 
come to understand the warning to mean that lines on the roadway are being crossed, not 
that a lane departure is about to occur.  As long as the road features to which the alarm is 
responding are obvious to the driver, the alert may continue to be perceived by the driver 
as reliable even though it may be drawing incorrect conclusions about the vehicle’s actual 
lane position.  If the driver is able to understand the basic competence of the warning 
system, the system might be perceived as reliable and understandably incorrect from time 
to time.  However, even if a driver understands why an incorrect warning occurs, there is 
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probably a limit to the degree to which a driver will tolerate incorrect warnings under 
routine circumstances.  For example, if an LDW is sensitive to the slightest lane 
deviation, drivers may eventually disregard the warning. 
LDW is a simple warning, and in many respects its operation may be more 
transparent to drivers than other warning systems.  Drivers normally track lane position 
continuously as part of routine driving and are likely able to evaluate the operation of an 
LDW system.  In contrast, other warning systems are designed to enhance a driver’s 
normal perceptual or attentional capabilities.  They may detect unseen objects (e.g., a 
vehicle’s presence in the blind spot) or road conditions with precision that is beyond a 
driver’s normal ability (e.g., range or closing speed on a forward vehicle), or make 
judgments about complex traffic configurations (e.g., intersection gap acceptance) that 
may exceed a driver’s ability to quickly comprehend.  In such cases, a warning may 
occur for no reason that is immediately apparent to the driver, unless the warning system 
also provides some explanatory information.  For example, a lateral collision warning 
system may need to provide more precise warning messages about the radial direction of 
a threat so that a driver understands that the system occasionally mistakes stationary 
roadside objects for vehicles.  Without an understanding of the system’s competence, 
drivers may perceive the warnings as inconsistent and unreliable.  Although a system 
may be perfectly accurate in detecting dangerous road conditions (i.e., according to 
design), from the viewpoint of the driver it may appear to be producing unpredictable 
warnings without cause.  A driver’s opinion about a warning system’s reliability may 
thus be negatively affected if it is difficult to understand the reason for a warning.  
Apart from the problem of subjective reliability, a system’s objective performance 
might be characterized by the kinds of objective warning errors it makes.  There are two 
kinds of such errors.  If a warning is given when the target condition is not present, it is 
considered to be a false positive (FP or false alarm).  If a warning fails to be given when a 
target condition is present, it is called a false negative (FN or a miss).  In collision 
warning systems, perceived reliability is likely to be based on the proportion of FP events 
to all warning events.  The discrete nature of a warning event may prompt a driver to 
judge the appropriateness of the warning when a warning occurs; the correctness of a 
nonwarning event is unlikely to be noticed in the same way.  Consequently, false positive 
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alerts (false alarms) are likely to be noticed by a driver, but false negatives—failures of 
an alert to occur when it should (i.e., a miss)—may not be noticed, especially if the 
condition is a priori difficult to perceive (e.g., presence of a vehicle in the blind spot).   
The possibility that perception of a warning system’s reliability is determined by 
the proportion of perceived false positive warnings among all the warnings generated 
raises the problem that a driver’s incomplete knowledge of the system’s operation can 
create an impression of unreliability.  This situation is further aggravated if the warning 
system is designed to warn about exceedingly rare events.  As will be discussed in the 
next section, even the most accurate of such warning systems is likely to generate more 
false positives than may be considered acceptable. 
Low Base Rate Events and Reliability 
In general, warning systems are designed to minimize false negatives (misses—
the probability of not warning when an event has occurred).  Viewed another way, it is 
the same as maximizing the probability of reporting a warning when one truly exists (i.e., 
the hit rate).  At the same time, another design goal is to minimize the number of false 
positive warnings (false alarms—the probability of warning when an event has not 
occurred).  However, when the base rate of the target event—the rate of the event that the 
collision warning system is designed to address—is very small, even a system that has a 
very high hit rate and a very low false alarm rate may produce warnings that are 
predominantly false alarms (Parasuraman, Hancock, & Olofinboba, 1997).  For example, 
suppose that a system generates a warning of a crash with 99 percent accuracy.  When a 
crash situation arises, 99 times out of 100, the system will produce a warning.  Also 
suppose that the warning system generates a false alarm 1 percent of the time.  When 
there is no crash condition, 1 time out of 100, the system may produce a warning.  If the 
base rate of the event is very small, say 1 in 100, half of the 198 warnings produced are 
false positives and half are true positives (shown in Figure 1).  The proportion of true 
positive (TP) warnings to all warnings (TP + FP) is called the positive predictive value of 
a warning (PPV).  The proportion of true negatives (TN) to all negatives (TN + FN) is 
called the negative predictive value (NPV).  
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With very small base rates, the PPV of a warning declines, presenting an 
increasing credibility problem for low probability events.  In this paper, we use the term 
reliability to refer to PPV to be consistent with previous literature.  Thus, if we assume a 
low base rate and exclude the subjective viewpoint of the driver, even a fairly accurate 
warning system is likely to have a low PPV. 
The problem of false positives (nuisance alarms) might be acceptable if the driver 
understands the reason for the warnings.  However, as discussed earlier, warning systems 
are often designed to warn about circumstances that may be beyond a driver’s ability to 
detect or comprehend.  This makes it nearly impossible for the driver to fully evaluate 
why the warning system generated a nuisance alarm (unless the system also supplies that 
information).  The driver has no choice but to believe that the alarm is incorrect (as it 
often will be) without knowing exactly why.  This is likely to contribute an additional 
component to the driver’s perception of system reliability. 
   
  
Figure 1.  This diagram illustrates the effect a low base rate has on proportion of true 
positive warnings (hits) to all warnings, or the positive predictive value (PPV) of a 
warning.  Although the warning system’s capability to discriminate warning conditions is 
actually fairly good, the PPV is 50 percent.  The negative predictive value in this example 
is exceedingly large (9801/9802 = 99.99 percent). 
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It is unclear whether the NPV of a warning system—the probability that a 
dangerous condition is not present when no warning occurs—plays a role in a driver’s 
perception of warning system reliability.  In many cases, the driver may simply not notice 
that the warning system failed to warn about a potential collision event.  More often, 
collision warning systems are designed with a bias to warn because the cost of failing to 
warn is high.  Coupled with a low base rate that a warning condition is present, there may 
be too few nonwarning events where a threat is actually present to base perceived 
reliability on this type of warning failure.   
Perceived Reliability, Time History, and Context  
The perceived reliability of a collision warning system (CWS) is subject to 
development and change over time.  For example, at initial exposure to a CWS, drivers 
are likely to have some preconceived beliefs about the system’s reliability.  During the 
initial learning period, drivers likely adjust their perceptions of system reliability as they 
learn more about the system.  As drivers are exposed to more and more warnings (both 
true and false), further adjustments in perceived reliability are likely to occur.  Drivers’ 
perception of the reliability of a warning system may wax with true warnings and wane 
with false warnings.  There are also likely to be individual differences in the degree to 
which drivers are influenced by true and false warnings.   
Reliability may also be influenced by driving context.  With specific knowledge 
about a warning system’s capabilities, drivers may learn to alter expectations about 
system performance in different driving conditions.  For example, expectations about a 
lateral drift system may be different in wet weather compared to dry, or on smooth well-
marked roads versus in construction sites.  Drivers might discount nuisance warnings in 
one context, and weigh them heavily in another context.  The effects of time history, 
operating context, task workload, self-confidence, and trust contribute to a person’s use 
of automation and have been discussed by Lee and his colleagues (Gao & Lee, 2006; Lee 
& Moray, 1992, 1994; Lee & See, 2004), and by Parasuraman and Riley (1997).  In the 
following analysis, some contextual influence may be observed as effects associated with 
light level, weather conditions, and road class. 
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Measurable Response Changes in Driver Performance 
A general problem faced by studies that attempt to link system reliability to driver 
performance is that objective system reliability may not match subjective reliability.  In 
the case of LDW, subjective impressions of reliability may coincide with objective 
reliability because the operation of the warning system may be somewhat transparent to 
the driver.  However, it is possible that a system might be perceived as unreliable even 
though its objective performance is completely reliable.  To the extent that both the driver 
and the warning system share the same idea of what constitutes a threat, objective and 
subjective reliability should converge.  It is assumed, in this case, that both the warning 
system and the driver have access to the same basic pre-crash data; in the example of 
LDW, that would be the vehicle’s position in the lane. 
To infer the effects of perceived reliability from driver performance, measurable 
performance characteristics are required that indicate changes in a driver’s reliance on or 
compliance with the system.  Possible indicators may include the proportion of alerts 
ignored by a driver (indicative of false positives and a measure of subjective reliability) 
and the driver’s latency to respond to an alert.  Low reliability may result in an increased 
latency to respond or outright ignoring of the alert.  High reliability may result in 
decreased latency responses and few ignored alerts.  Underlying these suggested effects 
is the relationship among calibration, resolution, and automation capability (Lee & See, 
2004; Parasuraman & Riley, 1997).  If drivers do not trust the system, they may calibrate 
their responses to ignore the system completely (i.e., disuse).  On the other hand, if 
drivers place excessive trust in the system, they may misuse the system.  An extreme 
example of this would be a driver who no longer actively monitors lane position and 
instead guides his/her vehicle by the LDW warnings.  This may be measured as short, 
automatic, response times or an increased number of warning events. 
Finally, it should be mentioned that the influence of warning reliability on a 
driver’s performance is also dependent on workload.  Under light workload, a driver may 
have sufficient “spare” capacity so that reliance on the warning system is minimal.  If the 
driver is monitoring lane position assiduously, steering response may be independent of 
the warnings.  Under heavy workload, drivers may be compelled to distribute their 
attention over several tasks, inducing them to rely on the lateral drift warning more 
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heavily.  In this context, an unreliable warning may not only be unwelcome, but it may 
also be apportioned less attention, resulting in increased response delays (see Wickens & 
Dixon, 2005, for a discussion about the influence of reliability under high and low 
workload).  Wickens and Dixon found in a meta-analysis of 20 studies that the effect of 
reliability on performance in high workload conditions is greater than in low workload 
conditions.  A greater dependence on automation was found to be imposed by high 
workload situations.  This could be revealed as an interaction between the reliability 
measure and high-workload conditions such that differences in reliability affect responses 
to LDW more when visibility is poor (e.g., at night or in wet weather) or when traffic is 





The determination of how warning system reliability affects driving performance 
in naturalistic driving requires both a clear definition of the measure of warning 
reliability along with a measure of driver performance.  For this analysis, we focused on 
the operation of the lateral drift warning (LDW) system (Pomerleau et al., 1999) used in 
the road departure crash warning (RDCW) field operational test (for details about the 
LDW operation see LeBlanc et al., 2006; Pomerleau et al., 1999 ). In naturalistic driving 
conditions, the pacing of warnings is more realistic, roadside events are less predictable, 
and driving is more purposeful than in a structured experiment.  Some of these 
differences may affect the degree to which driving performance is influenced by warning 
reliability.  
The LDW system uses image analysis techniques and radar to determine whether 
the host vehicle is departing from the roadway.  Auditory or haptic warnings are 
generated whenever the vehicle crosses a painted line, or road edge, or laterally veers 
toward a solid object alongside the road.  Two kinds of alerts are generated: a cautionary 
alert when the vehicle crosses a dashed line and an imminent alert when the vehicle 
crosses a solid line or veers toward an object.  The cautionary alert is a vibration on the 
left or right side of the driver’s seat (the same side as the lane deviation) with a 
cautionary message presented on a display; the imminent alert is an auditory warning 
with a warning message on the display.  In this study, both imminent and cautionary 
warnings were considered together. 
Data were collected just after activation of the LDW system for each participating 
driver.  It contains detailed driving data for 78 laypersons driving one of 11 instrumented 
test vehicles for a period of 26 days each.  Both the LDW and curve speed warning 
(CSW) systems were activated on the seventh day of driving and remained active for 20 






The 78 participants were equally divided into three age groups: 26 young (20 to 
30 years old), 26 middle-aged (40 to 50 years old), and 26 older (60 to 70 years old) 
subjects.  Each group was evenly split by gender.   
Dependent Measure 
In this study, the driver’s response was defined as the time taken to initiate a 
corrective action after a warning is given.  In the case of LDW, that would be the delay 
between an LDW and the driver’s steering correction to adjust the vehicle’s lane position 
away from the lane edge.  The start of the corrective maneuver was determined by 
examining the rate of change in the steering wheel angle during a time window that 
began three seconds before the warning and ended three seconds after it.  The 
computational procedure first eliminated any fixed offset errors in the steering wheel 
angle measurement by subtracting the steering wheel angle offset found during straight 
driving.  Steering wheel angle was then converted to steering rate-of-change.  Steering 
rate-of-change was examined for events that exceeded a ±3 deg/sec threshold within a 
six-second time window that was centered on the time of an LDW warning.  The 
resulting algorithm identified the start times of relatively abrupt steering activity in the 
direction opposite of the warning around the time of an LDW.  An example of the 
resulting steering response detection algorithm is shown in Figure 2.  It shows a steering 
response preceding a warning, and another steering response following a warning.  The 
primary response measure, the latency to respond to an LDW, was calculated as the time 
delay between the warning and the detected start of a corrective steering response.  
Nonresponses and steering responses that involved lane changes were excluded from this 
analysis. 
The LDW system often delivered a warning after a driver’s corrective steering 
action was underway (i.e., in the three seconds preceding the warning).  There are also 
cases in which the steering action was initiated within 200 ms after the warning was 
produced.  In both the former and the later cases, it is unlikely that the driver was actually 
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responding to the LDW, but rather was taking independent action to correct a self-
monitored lateral drift.  Thus, for each LDW, a driver could be characterized as either 
(1) not producing any steering response in the six-second window around the warning, 
(2) responding with a steering correction too early for it to be considered a reaction the 
warning, or (3) responding in the 200-3000 ms interval after the warning.  The reaction 








































Figure 2.  This plot shows the detected steering response around the time of an LDW.  
The pre-alert steering response (inside the gray band on left) identifies an abrupt steering 
response that preceded the LDW.  The post-alert steering response (inside the gray band 
on right) identifies the time of an abrupt steering response that follows an LDW. 
 
Measurement of Reliability 
In the case of the LDW system discussed in this report, objective measures of 
system reliability were not readily available.  Even if such measures were available, it is 
possible that they might not fully agree with the driver’s perceived reliability of the 
system.  Instead, a surrogate measure of perceived reliability was developed which was 
defined as the proportion of LDW warning events in which a lane-position correction was 
initiated by the driver near the time of the warning.  An LDW event was identified as a 
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false positive if no steering response was observed within the six-second time window 
surrounding the warning.  It was considered a correct detection (a hit) if any appropriate 
steering response occurred (i.e., a brisk steering response in the direction away from the 
lateral drift), including responses that preceded the warning.  This was based on an 
assumption that a driver would regard the warning as reliable as long it occurred in close 
temporal proximity to an actual condition that would require a steering correction.  That 
is, the driver might have a more relaxed view of the appropriateness of the warning 
timing, and may not regard a late warning as a false alarm.  LDW reliability was then 
characterized by the ratio of true positive warnings to the total number of warnings.  As 
mentioned earlier, negative predictive value played no role in the reliability measure. 
Perceived reliability may also have a dynamic/historic characteristic that might 
change over the course of the study.  It was therefore modeled as a time-based predictor 
of steering response latency.  For each driver’s steering response to a warning, a 
perceived reliability measure was calculated for that response.  The measure was 
calculated as the proportion of LDW warnings that elicited a steering response over the 
previous 24-hour period—the day proportion.  If the perceived reliability of the warning 
influences driving behavior, we might expect to observe it in the driver’s latency to 
initiate a steering correction.  Similar effects on response time have been reported with 
respect to driver braking (e.g., Bliss & Acton, 2003) and it is reasonable to expect that 
steering responses may be affected in similar ways. 
Three variables were also examined as surrogate workload manipulations: 
weather condition (clear/active precipitation), ambient light level (dark/light), and road 
class (limited access/surface roadways).  Driver workload is likely to be higher during 
times of active precipitation and in darkness when visibility is reduced, and on local 
roads where there is often little separation between vehicle traffic and pedestrian activity.  
Age and gender were also examined to determine if response time to LDWs are 
influenced by these factors.  Driver age was classified into three categories: young (20 to 
30 years old), middle (40 to 50 years old), and old drivers (60 to 70) years old. 
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Results 
In the three-week interval examined in this report, driver age groups differed in 
the number of times a warning was given: the mean total warning count was 58 for 
younger drivers, 53 for middle-aged drivers, and 28 for older drivers, F(2,75) = 3.9, 
p = .02.  Drivers with fewer than 10 responses to the LDW were excluded from these 
analyses and, as mentioned earlier, cases in which a post-warning steering response 
occurred less than 200 ms after the warning were also excluded.  Finally, cases in which a 
steering response was preceded by another steering response (i.e., before the warning) 
were also excluded from the analysis.  In these cases, the driver is already engaged in a 
corrective steering maneuver and the driver’s action is unlikely to have been instigated by 
the warning system. 
Of the original 78 drivers in the study, 42 drivers remained in the sample after the 
above filtering procedures were applied.  The filter affected older drivers more than it 
affected the other age groups.  Table 1 shows the final breakdown of subjects by age and 
gender. 
 
Table 1   
Breakdown of number of drivers by age and gender with 10 or more responses to the 
LDWs.  The mean number of responses for the three-week observation period is given in 
parentheses. 
 
Age Male Female Total 
Young 7 (12.6) 9 (15.7) 16 (14.3) 
Middle 9 (16.1) 7 (11.0) 16 (13.9) 
Old 5 (9.0) 5 (14.2) 10 (11.6) 




A mixed-model analysis of variance examined the effects of two categorical 
between-subject factors—age group (young, middle, older) and gender (male, female)—
and three categorical within-subject factors—ambient light levels (dark, light), 
windshield wiper state (off, on), and road class (limited access, surface streets)—on 
steering response latency.  In addition, each subject’s day proportion measure of 
reliability was included in the analysis as a within-subject covariate.  Drivers whose prior 
24 hours experience of the LDW system involved proportionally higher responses to 
warnings also displayed shorter reaction times, F(1, 325) = 4.34, p < .05 (shown in Table 
2).  The estimated slope of reaction time as a function of reliability was -323 ms; that is, 
as the percentage of steering responses to LDW over the prior 24 hours increases from 0 
to 100 percent, reaction time is projected to decrease by 323 ms. 
 
Table 2 
Results of a mixed-model ANOVA relating steering reaction time to gender, age, wiper 
state, light level, road class, and day-ratio.  The asterisk indicates statistical significance 
at .05 level. 
 
Effect F-Ratio p 
Gender F(1,28.3) = 0.58 .45 
Age Group F(2,24.4) = 2.83 .08 
Wiper State F(2, 324) = 0.96 .38 
Light Level F(1,31.6) = 0.32 .57 
Road Class F(1,82.3) = 0.76 .47 
Day Proportion F(1,325)  = 4.34 .04*
 
A marginal effect of age group was also observed in the data (see Table 2).  This 
was further explored by simplifying the model to drop some factors that are likely to be 
correlated with age.  For example, older drivers appear to be less inclined to drive in 
darkness, in bad weather, and on limited access roadways than younger drivers (Baldock, 
Mathias, McLean, & Berndt, 2006; Ball et al., 1998; Langford & Koppel, 2006).  Thus 
the variables light level, road class, and wiper state in the present analysis may be related 
to age, absorbing some of the explanatory effects of age on response.  If these factors are 
removed from the analysis, a main effect of driver age is observed, F(2, 479) = 5.17, 
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p < .01.  The older driver group is faster to respond to the warning than the younger 
drivers by about 354 ms, t(479) = 3.15, Bonferroni adjusted p < .01, and faster than the 
middle-aged group by about 295 ms t(479) = 2.63, Bonferroni adjusted p = .03.  Perhaps 
the age factor should be considered a cluster of behavioral patterns that include 
preferences for roadway, daylight, and clear weather, as well as a possibly more 
compliant attitude that results in faster responding to the LDW system. 
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Discussion 
The present results suggest that there is a relationship between a driver’s prior 
experience of the LDW warning system in the 24 hours before a responded to warning 
and the speed of that response.  Drivers appear to respond faster if the prior warnings are 
perceived to be reliable.  It is important to note that this result is not exhibited by all 
drivers in the study, and that it is a correlational outcome.  That is, perceived reliability 
was not directly manipulated in the study.  It is also important to remember that the 
definition of reliability used here is nonstandard.  It is neither an objectively defined 
measure nor a directly manipulated measure and may not be easily comparable to other 
studies in which reliability is directly manipulated.  Indeed, in the analysis of naturalistic 
driving, direct manipulation of variables is often not feasible and control over the analysis 
is imposed by selection of “relevant” conditions.  The derived reliability measure should 
not be mistaken for an independent variable and its relationship to steering response 
latency could be mediated by other variables that were not measured.  It is also worth 
noting that these data do not include nonresponses to alerts, because a nonresponse could 
mean either that a driver ignored a true warning or dismissed the warning as false.  
Despite these limitations, it is the first evidence that driving performance may be related 
to the reliability of prior warnings found in a naturalistic driving dataset. 
The observed effect on driver performance is relatively weak.  The observed 
difference in steering latency between a warning system with zero percent and 100 
percent reliability is about 300 ms.  Given that warning reliability normally varies in a 
much smaller range, actual behavioral effects are likely to be much smaller.  This may 
not be surprising.  Ben-Yaacov, Maltz, and Shinar (2002) have reported no effect of 
reliability with a headway warning system in a semi-realistic driving study where 
reliability varied between 60 and 95 percent. (In the present study, the averaged day 
proportions among drivers ranged between 37 and 100 percent, with a mean of 77 
percent.)  This is somewhat different from results reported in simulator studies.  For 
example, Bliss and Acton (2003) reported that increased reliability increases the 
frequency and appropriateness of reactions to warnings.  However they also found that 
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the collision rate was smaller in their lowest reliability condition, attributing it to the 
potentially distracting effect of the high urgency warnings used in the study.   
Unlike many recent studies of reliability, the present method allows for the 
possibility that a driver’s perception of reliability is influenced by immediate past 
experience with the system.  Stated another way, this method attempts to associate 
performance with a near-term measure of reliability, allowing for the possibility that 
perceived reliability may vary over time.  This view is related to previous theoretical 
work on trust in automation that suggests trust evolves and is influenced by past 
experience with the system operation.  Trust, in turn, influences how (and if) an operator 
will engage automation (Gao & Lee, 2006; Lee & Moray, 1992, 1994; Lee & See, 2004; 
Parasuraman & Riley, 1997).   
It is important to note that, in this study, no baseline data are available that 
describes driver performance in the absence of the LDW system.  What is shown is a 
relationship between a measure of reliability and the driver’s latency to react with a 
steering correction.  Thus, cost and benefit of the LDW system cannot easily be 
determined as in other collision warning studies (e.g., Wickens & Dixon, 2005).   
The most important contribution of the present study is that it examines driver 
behavior outside of a well-structured experimental context in which warning events are 
relatively frequent and scripted, participants are willing and compliant, safety is 
guaranteed, and the possibility that demand characteristics may influence observations is 
ever-present.  The present study provides a realistic view of how the reliability of one 
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